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This paper characterizes the optimal quality regulation of a monopolist when quality is
observable. In contrast to Sheshinski (1976) it is shown that a minimum quality standard may
be desirable even if it induces the firm to reduce output.
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It has long been known that the provision of product quality under monopoly is distorted away
from the social optimum even if quality is observable. In particular, Spence (1975) and Sheshinski￿ s
(1976) by now classic papers have shown that a monopolist chooses the level of quality that suits
the marginal consumer, while a social planner takes the valuations of all consumers into account.
Therefore, to the extent that inframarginal consumers have a higher (lower) valuation for quality
than marginal consumers, a monopolist provides too little (too much) quality, given the size of
demand.1
In principle, this market failure can be corrected by imposing the welfare maximizing price
and quality on the ￿rm. In practice, however, it is often not feasible or desirable to regulate the
price. One prominent reason is that the prospect of pro￿ts is what gives ￿rms an incentive to
provide desired products in the ￿rst place. Hence, Sheshinski (1976) analyzes the optimal quality
regulation of a monopoly in the absence of price interventions.2
Two basic cases are distinguished. When quality and quantity are complements so that pxq > 0,
the optimal regulation can not generally be determined. However, when they are substitutes
(pxq < 0), there is a clear policy implication (Sheshinski 1976, p. 135):3
"... when pxq < 0 the regulator, starting from the monopoly equilibrium (^ x; ^ q),
should seek to raise quality levels if mq ￿ cxq > 0 but to lower them if mq ￿ cxq < 0
..."
Alas, this result, which is the central proposition for the quality regulation of a monopolist, is
wrong. In fact, the direction of quality regulation does not change with the sign of the e⁄ect of
a quality increase on the monopolist￿ s marginal pro￿t (mq ￿ cxq in Sheshinski￿ s model). Rather,
the optimal policy can be described as follows: A minimum quality regulation improves welfare by
providing a quality level that is closer to consumers￿wants. However, if the price is unregulated,
the monopolist responds to the regulation by increasing prices. If this price increase is so high that
demand decreases despite higher quality, there is an additional monopoly distortion that counters
the positive e⁄ect of the regulation. As a consequence, if the demand reduction is very strong,
the regulator should reduce the level of quality the monopolist provides instead of increasing it.
The aim of this note is to demonstrate this claim within Sheshinski￿ s model.
2 The Model
I will use Sheshinski￿ s original formulation to derive the optimal regulatory policy. There is a
monopolist producing a good of quality q ￿ 0 which he sells for price p ￿ 0. Inverse demand is
1The argument extends to oligopolistic market structures.
2Sheshinski (1976) focusses on the case where quality is observable and the ￿rm is a single-product monopolist.
In alternative settings, di⁄erent results may obtain (see for instance the survey by Sappington, 2005).
3Fortunately, the latter case seems to be more relevant in practice. pxq < 0 means that consumers with a higher
valuation for a product also have a higher valuation for quality improvements. This is routinely assumed in models
of product di⁄erentiation and price discrimination (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978, and Besanko, Donnenfeld, and
White, 1987).
1given by p(x;q) where x ￿ 0 denotes the quantity sold. It is assumed that px(x;q) < 0, pq(x;q) > 0
and pxq < 0.4 Total costs are denoted by c(x;q) with cx(x;q) > 0 and cq(x;q) > 0.
Firm and regulatory authority play a two-stage game. In stage one the regulator chooses q to
maximize welfare taking into account that the monopolist chooses x to maximize pro￿t in stage
two. The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function is ￿(x;q) = p(x;q)x ￿ c(x;q). Solving the game by backward
induction the second stage outcome is therefore given by the ￿rst order condition
￿x(x;q) = px(x;q)x + p(x;q) ￿ cx(x;q) = 0. (1)
The appropriate second order condition ￿xx(x;q) < 0 will be assumed to hold.




p(z;q)dz ￿ c(x(q);q). (2)
This yields the ￿rst order condition
dV
dq






pq(z;q)dz ￿ cq = 0 (3)
where the appropriate second order condition d2V=dq2 < 0 is again assumed to be ful￿lled. This
gives us the (second best) regulatory equilibrium (x￿;q￿). We will have to compare this with an
unregulated situation.
Without regulation the producer chooses quality directly to maximize pro￿ts. The market
outcome (^ x; ^ q) is characterized by (1) and the ￿rst order condition with respect to q,
￿q(x;q) = pq(x;q)x ￿ cq(x;q) = 0. (4)
Additional second order conditions are ￿qq < 0 and ￿xx￿qq ￿￿2
xq > 0 which are again assumed to
hold.
The most convenient way of comparing q￿ and ^ q is by representing the two solutions graphically
in an (x;q) plane. (^ x; ^ q) is determined by the intersection of the curves ￿x = 0 and ￿q = 0, given











pxxx + 2px ￿ cxx
pxqx + pq ￿ cxq
. (5)
By the second order condition this has the same sign as ￿xq, the marginal impact of q on (1).
Figure 1 (a) displays the case where ￿xq > 0 (with an upward sloping curve ￿x = 0) while the
case ￿xq < 0 is represented in Figure 1 (b) (with a downward sloping curve ￿x = 0). Using (4),











pxqx + pq ￿ cxq
pqqx ￿ cqq
(6)
4Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
2Figure 1: The regulatory solution
which (again by the second order condition) also has the same sign as ￿xq. Simple algebra
shows that dq=dxj￿x=0 > dq=dxj￿q=0 is equivalent to ￿xx￿qq > ￿2
xq (when ￿xq > 0), respectively
￿xx￿qq < ￿2
xq (when ￿xq < 0). As we know ￿xx￿qq > ￿2
xq to be true from the second order
conditions, the curve ￿x = 0 is steeper than the curve ￿q = 0 around (^ x; ^ q) in both cases. Figure
1 presents the unregulated solution graphically.
(x￿;q￿) are jointly determined by the intersection of the curves ￿x = 0 and dV=dq = 0 given
by (1) and (3). Characterizing the latter turns out to be a bit more tedious. What complicates
matters is that dV=dq = 0 takes the impact of q on x into account. In order to determine its





pq(z;q)dz ￿ cq = 0. (7)
Since by assumption pxq < 0, it follows that pq(z;q) > pq(x;q) for all q and z < x. Therefore,
Vq =
R x
0 pq(z;q)dz￿cq(x;q) > pq(x;q)x￿cq(x;q) = ￿q. That is, whenever Vq = 0, we have ￿q < 0.
As ￿qq < 0, q must be decreased to reach ￿q = 0 given x. In other words, the curve Vq = 0 lies
everywhere above the curve ￿q = 0. This is shown in Figure 1 (a) and (b).
Next we will determine the position of dV=dq = 0: Plugging (1) and (7) into (3) we ￿nd that
dV=dq = ￿pxx￿dx=dq+Vq = 0. Using (5) and the fact that px < 0, we have sign[￿pxx￿dx=dq] =
sign[dx=dq] = sign[￿xq]. Assume ￿rst that ￿xq > 0 (Figure 1 (a)). Then from an arbitrary (x;q)
that satis￿es Vq = 0, q must be increased given x to reach dV=dq = 0 if and only if Vqq < 0.5 Note
that Vqq < 0 is a second order condition for the ￿rst best solution (x￿￿;q￿￿) where both quantity
and quality are regulated. Hence, it is a mild requirement and I follow Sheshinski (1976) in
assuming it. From the previous arguments it can be concluded that dV=dq = 0 lies above Vq = 0.
As Figure 1 (a) shows, we therefore have q￿ > ^ q and x￿ > ^ x at the intersection of dV=dq = 0 and
￿x = 0.
5At (x;q) satisfying Vq = 0 we must decrease Vq to reach dV=dq = 0 as dV=dq > Vq = 0. When Vqq < 0 such a
decrease implies an increase in q.
3Next assume ￿xq < 0 (Figure 1 (b)). By a similar argument we ￿nd that dV=dq = 0 lies
below Vq = 0. Clearly, how much it lies below depends on the magnitude of ￿xq. Figure 1 (b)
presents two possibilities, the curve dV=dq = 0 (￿xq small) and the curve dV=dq = 0 (￿xq large),
demonstrating that we may either have q￿ > ^ q and x￿ < ^ x or q￿ < ^ q and x￿ > ^ x, contradicting the
mistaken result in Sheshinski (1976) who claims that one can always conclude q￿ < ^ q and x￿ > ^ x.
The di⁄erence is seen most clearly when ￿xq = 0. In this case a regulatory intervention in q does
not alter the monopolist￿ s quantity choice. Hence, an in￿nitesimal increase in q has the welfare
improving impact of increased quality without side-e⁄ects.6 There is no e⁄ect on welfare regarding
the monopoly quantity distortion, so the overall e⁄ect is clearly positive while Sheshinski￿ s result
suggests that there is no impact on welfare. When ￿xq > 0, a minimum quality requirement even
has a positive e⁄ect on the monopoly distortion through increased output. Finally, if ￿xq < 0,
then a small quality increase unfortunately triggers a larger monopoly distortion as monopoly
prices go up too much to sustain the demand level. As long as the positive welfare e⁄ect of a
quality increase is strong enough, however, there is scope for a minimum quality regulation even
in this case.
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